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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1965, the Federal Communications Commission ("Commission" or
"FCC") articulated certain financial requirements that applicants for
broadcast licenses must satisfy. Specifically, applicants had to show they
had sufficient funds to cover application costs, construction costs, and the
operating expenses for one year without any revenue offsets.' This
standard, known after the 1965 case as the Ultravision standard, was
viewed as implementing the general requirements that "all applications ...
shall set forth such facts as the Commission by regulation may prescribe as
to the... financial ...qualifications of the applicant." 2
The Commission reduced the operating expense part of the financial
qualification to the first three months of operation in a series of decisions in
1978, 1979, and 1981.3 In announcing these actions, the Commission
explicitly cited its concern about the level of minority ownership of
broadcasters:
In announcing this policy change, the Commission considers its
action to be one which will provide a more reasonable and realistic
financial qualification standard for all aural applicants and will
specifically benefit minority applicants seeking entry into the radio
broadcast service. The Commission's decision here is- based, in large
1. Ultravision Broad. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 1 F.C.C.2d 544, 5 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 343 (1965), modified, 72 F.C.C.2d 784,45 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 925 (1979).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 308(b) (1994). See also § 319(a) (similar language).
3. Fin. Qualifications Standards for Aural Broad. Applicants, Public Notice, 69
F.C.C.2d 407, 408, 43 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1101 (1978) [hereinafter Aural Broad.
Applicants, Public Notice]; New Fin. Qualifications Standard for Broad. Television
Applicants, Public Notice, 72 F.C.C.2d 784, 784, 45 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 925 (1979); New

Fin. Qualifications Standard for Broad. Assignment and Transfer Applicants, Public Notice,
87 F.C.C.2d 200, 200, 49 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1291 (1981) [hereinafter Transfer
Applicants, PublicNotice].

Number 1]

FINANCIAL QUAUIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

part, on the finding, in its Minority Ownership Task Force Report, that
station financing has been a principal barrier to minority broadcast
ownership.'t
Additionally, the Ultravision standard conflicts with Commission
policies favoring minority ownership and diversity because its
stringency may inhibit potential applicants from seeking broadcast
licenses.
As stated, the underlying rationale is that the financial qualification
standard poses a barrier to the entry of new firms into the broadcast market,
and this barrier affects, on a disproportionate basis, minority-owned firms
which are generally smaller and less well financed than non-minority
firms.6
While the specific policies and regulations discussed here date back to
the 1980s, the issue of minority ownership remains 'timely for three
reasons: (1) the renewed interest of the Commission in increasing minority
ownership of broadcasters,7 (2) the changes in ownership limits enacted in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996,8 and (3) the planned use of auctions
to award new television broadcast licenses,9 possibly raising new barriers to
the entry of minorities.
This Article focuses on how one might collect and analyze evidence
to measure the economic effects of the financial qualification requirements.
This Article shall ignore the questions whether these requirements are
politically desirable or constitutional, and instead it will focus on
economic, not legal, analysis, and examine three major research questions:
(1) Did the FCC's financial qualification regulations in the 1980s
create an unreasonable disadvantage to minorities in the award of new
broadcast licenses?
4. Aural Broad. Applicants, PublicNotice, supranote 3, at 407.
5. Transfer Applicants, PublicNotice, supra note 3, at 201.
6. Of course, questions remain as to whether the financial qualification standards
reduced station failures or had other beneficial effects. In the 1981 decision, the
Commission was doubtful about the usefulness of the one-year Ultravision standard. The
Commission stated, "[fWinally, it has been our experience and observation that station failure
rates have not been affected substantially by the Ultravision standard, but rather depend
more upon market forces, competition, the general state of the economy, or the quality of
station management." Id.
7. See William E. Kennard, Mastering Opportunity, Remarks at National Black Media
Coalition Master Communicators Awards Luncheon (Dec. 2, 1998) at http:lwwv.fcc.gov/
Speeches/Kennardlspwek835.html; Statement of FCC Chairman William Kennard on
Minority Broadcast Ownership (Feb. 16, 1999), at http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/
Kennard/Statementsstwek9l0ihtml.
8. Telecommunications Act of 1996 § 202, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 110.
9. See FCC Reaffirms Auction Procedures for Competing Commercial Broad. License
and ITFS Applications, Mass MediaAction, Rpt. No. MM 99-4, 1999 FCC LEXIS 1597.
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(2) Can one measure the economic effects on minority broadcasters,
on minority employment, and on program suppliers?
(3) Can one detect any effect on programming and editorial content of
these financial requirements?
The questions this Article addresses are both important and complex.
Rarely does one event or policy occur in isolation, so generally one cannot
rely on straightforward scientific experiments or quasi-experiments to
answer the specific research questions that arise. For example, no one
expects the Commission to impose one set of rules on half of the country,
while refraining from doing so for the other half, just to facilitate the
measurement of the consequences of those rules. Instead, this Article
demonstrates a research model and design that, hopefully, enables the
detection and measurement of the effects of a specific policy or scenario, as
unambiguously as possible and with little confounding.'
This Article will follow a traditional economic approach:
(1) Present the specific issues in economic terms.
(2) Develop a logical model that relates various factors to the issues at
hand.
(3) Describe the data necessary to demonstrate how sample analyses
of that data might be undertaken.

I. FINANCIAL QUALIFICATION REGULATIONS IN THE 1980s AND
UNREASONABLE DISADVANTAGE TO MINORITIES IN THE
AWARD OF NEW BROADCAST LICENSES
A. Background and Economic Logic
Traditional industrial economics texts have long considered the need
for start-up capital to be a significant barrier to the entry of new firms into a
market. Douglas Greer, in his 1980 textbook on industrial organization,
offers an especially clear statement of this phenomenon:
In any event, if the capital costs of efficient entry are appreciably more
than what you and your friends can scrape together from your savings,
say $1 billion, then capital costs pose a barrier to entry-even when
MES [minimum efficient scale] plant is small relative to industry
demand.
This barrier might be classified with the other absolute cost barriers
mentioned earlier, since its effect often shows up in higher costs of
borrowing, namely, higher interest rates. On the other hand, there are
several features of this barrier that distinguish it. For one thing, it is
10. The economic and financial model that this Article develops is contained in a single
Excel spreadsheet, available from the Author upon request.
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closely connected to scalar elements, whereas other absolute unit cost
differences are not. Second, the deterrence of this barrier depends on
the nature of the potential entrant as well as on the nature of the
industry."
There are two conceptualizations of this barrier. First, minorityowned firms (and possibly smaller firms in general), for one or more
reasons, have less access to capital markets and traditional lenders. As a
result, when they do get start-up financing, the cost of that financing is
higher than to other firms. This constitutes the "weak" version of the
barrier.
Second, minority-owned firms simply cannot obtain start-up
financing from financial institutions, because the lenders do not make
sufficient funds available at any price (interest rate) or because the price is
so high as to make the investment unprofitable for the borrower. This
constitutes the "strong" version of the barrier.
The Commission has acknowledged that lack of access to financing
creates a barrier to the entry of minority owners in broadcasting. 2 This lack
of access to financing may result from discrimination in financial markets,
including discrimination by commercial banking institutions, that affects a
variety of minority banking customers, of which broadcasters are one type.
To put this in context, in 1968, the Commission took the lead in focusing
on discriminatory employment practices, stating it would deny licenses to
stations that practiced deliberate discrimination. 3 At approximately the
same time, in 1974, Congress addressed
the issue of discrimination with the
4
Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
The Commission has addressed the issue of minority access to startup funds through policies such as tax certificates and distress sale
regulations. Tax certificates allowed the sellers of broadcast property to
postpone the capital gains tax on the proceeds if they sold to a minoritycontrolled business. 5 The logic behind this policy was that deferring the

11. DOUGLASF. GRmm,INDUSTnIALORGANIZATIONANDPUBLIcPOLICY 174(1980).
12. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broad. Facilities, Public Notice,
68 F.C.C.2d 979,42 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1689 (1978).
13. Nondiscrimination Employment Practices of Broad. Licensees, Memorandun
Opinion and OrderandNotice of ProposedRulematking, 13 F.C.C.2d 766, para. 26, 13 Rad.
Reg.2d (P & F) 1645 (1968) [hereinafter Nondiscrimination Employment, Memorandum
Opinion and Order].
14. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691a-1691e (1994).
15. There are additional requirements; one in particular is that the seller re-invest the
proceeds into another broadcasting entity. 26 U.S.C. § 1071 (1994); 26 C.F.R. § 1071-3
(1987). For an analysis of this policy, see Bruce R. Wilde, Comment, FCC Tax Certificates
for Minority Ownership of Broadcast Facilities:A CriticalRe-examination of Policy, 138
U. PA. L. REV. 979 (1990).
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tax was equivalent to lowering the current effective tax rate, which would
increase after-tax profits for the seller. The seller could then pass some of
this increased profit on to the buyer in the form of a lower selling price,
resulting in a possible reduction of the financial barriers to entry.
Investors who provided the start-up financing for minority
broadcasters could obtain another form of tax certificate when they later
sold their interest in the broadcasting entity. The Commission stated, "The
use of tax certificates as creative financing tools will facilitate significantly
minority entrepreneurs' access to necessary financing,
thus effectuating the
'6
important policy of promoting minority ownership.'
In its 1995 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the Commission
summarized its views on tax certificates:
Exercising the authority conferred upon it by Section 1071 of the
Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 1071, the Commission has, since
1978, issued tax certificates to promote minority ownership of
broadcast stations. Under the current policy, such tax certificates are
awarded to encourage both the sale of facilities to minority purchasers
and the investment of start-up capital in minority entities. Thus, tax
certificates are available to (1) individuals and entities that sell a
broadcast station or cable system to a minority-controlled purchaser
and (2) equity holders in a minority-controlled broadcasting or cable
entity upon the sale of their equity, provided that their interest assisted
in financing the acquisition of a broadcast or cable property or was
purchased within the first year after broadcast license issuance, thus
contributing to the stabilization of the entity's capital base. In either
case, the tax certificate enables the seller to defer for two years the
gain realized by (1) treating it as an involuntary conversion, under 26
U.S.C. § 1033, with the recognition of gain avoided by the acquisition
of qualified replacement property; or (2) electing to reduce the17 basis of
certain depreciable property, under 26 U.S.C. § 1071, or both.
In other words, the intent of the tax certificate program was to lower the
effective cost of start-up capital, thereby addressing the weak form of the
barrier to entry, and possibly the strong form as well. Congress ended the
tax certificate program in 19958 In a recent article, Erwin Krasnow and
Lisa Fowlkes propose the reinstatement of the minority tax certificate
19
program.
16. Commission Policy Regarding the Advancement of Minority Ownership in
Broadcasting, Policy Statement and Notice of ProposedRulemaking, 92 F.C.C.2d 849, para.

15, 52 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F) 1301 (1982).
17. Policies and Rules Regarding Minority and Female Ownership of Mass Media
Facilities, Notice of ProposedRulemaking,10 F.C.C.R. 2788, para. 28 (1995).
18. Repeal of Nonrecognition of FCC Certified Sales and Exchanges § 2, 26 U.S.C. §

1071 (Supp. IV 1998).
19. Erwin G. Krasnow & Lisa M. Fowlkes, The FCC's Minority Tax Certificate
Program:A Proposalfor Life After Death, 51 FED. Co/Ni. L.J. 665, 667 (1999).
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The distress sale policy, also adopted in 1978, directly lowered the
price of a broadcast property for a minority-owned purchaser. A licensee
designated for a license revocation hearing could, for example, before the
hearing date, sell its broadcasting property to a minority group for seventyfive percent or less of the station's fair market value.20 This would
eliminate the need for the hearing and save the original owner from the
expense of legal proceedings to keep its license. This policy was held
unconstitutional in 1989.21
B. Economic Approaches
Possibly the most simplistic economic approach to measuring the cost
of the financial barrier to entry for minority broadcasters is to assume that
the weak barrier model applies, and to convert the extra cost of obtaining
financing to a lump-sum amount using an appropriate discount rate. The
higher interest rate for start-up funds leads to higher payments to lenders
and possibly higher required returns for equity investors. These additional
costs will occur over a number of years, but a present-value calculation can
convert them to a single sum as of the start-up date. There are several
conceptual problems with this approach, however. Some evidence suggests
that this approach would produce an overestimate, while other evidence
suggests an underestimate. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that
these problems would, by luck, cancel themselves out.
First, the additional barrier faced by minorities may be overestimated.
Some evidence suggests that it costs more to make loans to small
businesses and that such loans are viewed as being "information
intensive.' '2 The following 1994 testimony by James P. LaWare, a
governor of the Federal Reserve System, makes this point:
In particular, the number and dollar volume of loans and denial rates
provide no information on borrower characteristics and risks of the
loans that were made as compared to loans that were not made. (The
data also would not provide information about a particular lender's
evaluation standards.) If there is a common thread connecting small
20. See Statement of Policy on Minority Ownership of Broad. Facilities, Public Notice,
68 F.C.C.2d 979, 983, 42 Rad. Reg.2d (P & F)1689, 1695-1696 (1978). See also Philip H.
Lebowitz, FCC Minority DistressSale Policy: PublicInterest v. the Public'sInterest, 1981
Wis. L. REv. 365 (1981).

21. Shurberg Broad. of Hartford, Inc. v. FCC 876 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd,
497 U.S. 547 (1990).
22. See Availability of Credit to Minority-Owned Small Bus.: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. Supervision, Regulation and Deposit Ins. of the House Comm. on

Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 55-56 (1994) (statement of John P. LaWare,
Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.), reprintedin 80 FED.REs. BULL. 1080
(1994).
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businesses in the credit process, it is that lending to them is
information-intensive. That is, suppliers of credit need to gather an
extensive amount of information to accurately evaluate the potential
risks and returns on a loan. In addition to a borrower's financial
statements, if such exist, a lender needs to understand the markets in
which the business operates; to assess the value of assets that may
judgments about the financial
provide collateral; and to make
3
creditability of the management.
The differing costs of funds from regional lenders and larger national
lenders raises another issue. In discussing the nature of banking
relationships as a barrier to entry, W.G. Shepherd wrote:
Leading banks tend to be allied with the leading firms in their markets.
...All is not uniform: the largest firms often relate to several banks,
partly for regional convenience and partly to extract concessions from
them. Yet the normal pattern is a single, enduring banking relationship.
Larger firms generally relate to larger banks.
This link is two sided, with advantages for both the bank and the
firm. The firm gets credit in larger amounts and at lower interest costs.
It also gets valuable advice and information from the bank, plus a
degree of potential support against future stresses.24
Even with perfect credit markets, and without any unlawful discrimination
by lenders, one should expect to see higher interest rates or fees, or both,
charged to small businesses, start-ups, and similar less-established, nondominant firms in the acquisition of credit. From a policy perspective, the
relevant amounts include the increased charges that result from noneconomically justified criteria.
Of course, discrimination has existed, even when it would amount to
illogical (i.e., unprofitable) behavior by lenders. A classic statement on this
appears in the 1976 Senate Report on the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
("ECOA"):
[I]t must be established as clear national policy that no credit applicant
shall be denied the credit he or she needs and wants on the basis of
characteristics that have nothing to do with his or her creditworthiness.
The Committee readily acknowledges that irrational discrimination is
not in the creditor's own best interests because it means he is losing a
potentially valuable and creditworthy customer. But, despite this
logical truth, the hearing record is replete with examples of refusals to
extend or to continue credit arrangements for applicants falling within
one or more of the categories addressed by this bill.2
Second, the barrier faced by minorities may be underestimated.
Funding costs paid by minority broadcasters completely ignore the strong
23. l at 1083.

24. W. G. SHEPHERD, THE EcoNoMics OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 153-54 (1979).
25. S. REP. No. 94-589, at 3 (1976), reprintedin 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 403,405.
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version of the barrier. There are two possible scenarios. In one, no funding
is available at any price; and in the other, the higher cost of funding causes
the investment to be no longer profitable. In either case, the investments are
not made. The Senate Report on the ECOA, in the quote above, makes it
clear that these denials of credit occurred even when they were counter to
the best interests of the lenders.
Moreover, larger, more established entities typically use internally
generated funds. Smaller businesses, especially those owned by minorities,
rarely gain access to funds of this sort. As a result, smaller businesses rely
heavily on external funds, driving up their cost. Again, Shepherd noted:
"Most investment funds come from internal cash flow ... Among large
firms, the share of internal funds was even larger [than the average
percentage levels of 65% to 83% for all firms]. Most larger firms are
therefore not closely reliant on new outside funds. 26
Furthermore, financial considerations may have forced minority
principals to accept lower ownership interests than would otherwise have
been the case. The need for partners with access to funds may affect the
ownership and organizational structure of the enterprise.
Finally, minority owners may have purchased less costly and less
viable stations in smaller markets than they otherwise would have if the
barriers to entry had been lower. Part III of this Article addresses how one
can measure the social costs of each of these possible distortions.

111. QuANTIFICATION OF ECONOMIC EFFECTS
A. Direct andIndirectEffects
In any evaluation of the economic effects of a policy, such as the
financial qualification regulations, one must determine the scope of the set
of effects in which one is interested. First, one needs to decide whether to
look beyond the more obvious direct effects on the players in the specific
market being studied. In the broadcast context, these players include the
licensee, its employees, current and potential competitors for the license,
current and potential competitors delivering similar services, and the
current and potential audience.
Indirect effects, on the other hand, may accrue both to upstream
suppliers of programming, advertising, and equipment, and to information
and entertainment providers not considered part of the broadcast market.
With regard to the first group, this Article will not address the academic
issue of whether one should consider the audience as the final consumers of
26. SHEPHERD, supra note 24, at 155.
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programming and advertising, or whether one should view broadcasters as
selling their audience numbers to the advertisers. The second group could
include cable and satellite systems and their audiences, advertisers,
distributors, and suppliers. If broadcast programming and infrastructure
suppliers are included in the direct effects category, one might choose to
include the suppliers further upstream in the determination of indirect
effects. Finally, one should at least consider macroeconomic issues, such as
possible effects on the levels of overall employment and on foreign trade.
In Part III(C)(2)-(3), this Article discusses all of the possible effects
on employment and on program suppliers, but in Part IV(B) it develops
quantitative estimates of only the direct effects on broadcast station owners
and ignores all indirect effects.
B. Gross and Net Effects
In theory, one can approach the problem of identifying the effects of
the financial qualification requirements either by focusing on minority
broadcasters and applicants alone or by focusing on all broadcasters and
applicants. Imagine a policy, for example, that explicitly raises the costs
incurred by members of one group, while simultaneously lowering the
costs for the members of another group. From the point of view of the first
group, this is clearly a negative result, just as it is clearly positive from the
second group's perspective. From society's perspective, these gains and
losses may or may not cancel out; a net calculation is required. (Of course,
in this example, there are clear distributional and equity issues; one needs
to consider them in an appropriate framework.) This logic does not appear
to apply in the case of the financial qualification requirements, or if it does,
it is only of minor importance. The barriers to entry against minority firms
in obtaining broadcast licenses may have reduced the number of applicants
for any given license, but no locatable source argues that the costs of
obtaining licenses were somehow lowered by the reduction in competition.
As discussed below, minority broadcasters do not own a large percentage
of stations, and the number of unsuccessful license applications by
minorities was most likely a small fraction of the total as well.
Given all of these considerations, the calculations in Part IV(B) shall
focus exclusively on the costs to the minority community.
C. Specific Effects
1. Cost to Minority Broadcasters
At one level, the logic for considering the effects of barriers to entry,
such as the financial qualification regulations, on potential minority
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entrants into broadcasting is straightforward. As Kurt Wimmer put it in
1986, "Aiding minority ownership may, however, be justified as adding to
the economic base of the minority community. 27
More recently, Mark Lloyd of the Civil Rights Forum on
Communications Policy wrote in the same vein:
The failure of communications policy to guarantee access to
information services will not only stunt the social development of
communities, it will cut off economic opportunity.... As Congress
found in 1982, much of the "severe under-representation [sic] of
minorities" in the communications industry is caused by the "effects of
past inequities stemming from racial and ethnic discrimination." The
effects of this discrimination is [sic] exacerbated by continuing
discrimination in lending markets, as well as FCC ownership policies
which look to past broadcast experience in awarding licenses, and
reserve scarce spectrum for existing owners.2

2. Minority Broadcast Employment
The goal of increasing minority employment in broadcasting is
laudable in its own right. Furthermore, the FCC has stated that it has based
its regulations concerning nondiscrimination in employment on the
connection between the presence or absence of minority employees
29 and the
viewpoints.
and
tastes
minority
to
sensitive
programming
level of
Specific estimates vary, but even with the Commission's policies, the
percentage of minority professionals employed at broadcast stations
remained low through the 1970s and 1980s. In 1987, Wimmer reported:
Minorities are underrepresented in broadcast employment, holding
only 9.5 percent of management-level jobs [in 1983] even though they
compose at least 14.3 percent of the population. Although minority
employment increased annually beginning in 1971, it began to decline
in 1983. Over the most recent five-year period, employment of
minorities in the broadcast industry has increased only 1.3 percent.3"
In reviewing a longer period, Arthur Anastos presented a slightly better
picture; he cited FCC data that indicated the percentage of minority
professionals grew from 8% in 1971 to 16% in 1989.31
27. Kurt A. Wimmer, Deregulationand the Market Failurein MinorityProgramming:
The Socioeconomic Dimensions ofBroadcastReform, 8 HASTNGS CoMM. & ENT L. 329,

426 (1986).

28. Mark Lloyd, CommunicationsPolicy is a Civil Rights Issue, Civil Rights Forum, at

http:/vvw.civilrightsforum.orglcompolfull.htm (Aug. 4,1997), quoting IR.CoNi. REp.
97-765, at 43 (1982).

29. Nondiscrimination Employment, Memorandum Opinion and Order,supra note 13,

at 775-77.
30. Wimmer, supra note 27, at 432.
31. Jube Shiver, Jr., Bias ChallengesAgainst Stations' Licenses Soaring, L.A. TvS,
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If one were to focus on the employment effects, the research
questions include:
(1) How do employment patterns differ between minority
broadcasters and non-minority broadcasters?
(2) What is the appropriate approach to aggregate the differences in
minority employment across the entire set of applicable cases?
3. Programming and Program Suppliers
Possibly the most difficult research questions relate to programming
matters. There have been many studies that attempt to "explain" differences
in programming across groups of stations or relate programming choices to
station ownership. These studies do not all focus on minority versus nonminority ownership. Regardless, however, whether one looks at local
ownership versus group broadcasters or minority versus non-minority
ownership, the evidence of a link between ownership and content is
uncertain at best. The following are a few highly selective examples.
a.

Group Versus Nongroup Television Broadcasting

In 1967, Paul Baldridge found little difference between the
programming of group-owned and independently owned stations.32 Twelve
33
years later, using data supplied by the Citizens Communications Center,
the Author analyzed the local news and public affairs programming of the
VHF network affiliates in fifteen of the "Top 50" television markets that
had both group-owned and individually owned stations. 34 The Author found
that, on average, there was no difference in the amount of local and public
35
affairs programming done by the two groups.
b.

Minority Radio Broadcasting

In his 1981 analysis of programming on black-oriented radio stations,
James Jeter found no noticeable difference in either general content or in
the amount of news programming between those stations that were black-

July 16, 1990, at D1, noted in Arthur J. Anastos, The Fallacyof a Single Minority Broadcast
Voice: The Legacy of Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 15 COMMi. & L. 3, 8 (1993).
32. Paul D. Baldridge, Group and Non-Group-OwnerProgramming:A Comparative
Analysis, 11 J. BROAD. 125, 129-30 (1967).

33. Citizens Communications Center (1978). Comments submitted to the FCC in the
matter of Amendment of Sec. 73.636(a) (Washington, D.C.).
34. Yale M. Braunstein, The Potential for Increased Competition in Television
Broadcasting-Canthe Market Work?, in TIECOMm-NICATIONS POLICY AND THE CnMzE

55 (Timothy L Haight ed., 1979).
35. Id. at61.
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owned and those that were white-owned. In a separate study in the same
year, Loy Singleton found that the racial background of the station owner
did not explain any of the variance in the level of public affairs
programming at the black-oriented stations.3 Similarly, J.R. Schement and
Singleton found that the ethnic background of the owner was not a
significant predictor of the level of public service programming by
Spanish-language radio stations. They did, however, find a difference in
employment patterns. Latino owners hired more Latino managers than did
non-Latino owners. 38 Two years later, David Honig found that the levels of
minority employment and of programming aimed to minority audiences
were positively correlated
in both stations with minority-oriented
39
programming and without.
That these studies essentially stopped in 1984 is no accident. In 1984,
the Commission eliminated the requirement that broadcasters keep
programming logs available to the public. 0 On reconsideration, the FCC
adopted the existing "most significant treatment" requirement, which
effectively reduced the volume of programming licensees had to log.4 ' As a
result of these two Orders, the public does not have easy access to complete
programming logs.

C.

Later Studies

The FCC and the Congressional Research Service studied broadcast
entertainment programming using data collected by a Commissionadministered survey conducted in the mid-1980s. In 1992, Justice Thomas,
then a judge on the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, interpreted this report
for the majority as showing that female ownership had little effect on
content. 42 On the other hand, minority ownership did appear to affect

36. James P. Jeter, A Comparative Analysis of the Programming Practices of BlackOwned Black-Oriented Radio Stations and White-Owned Black-Oriented Radio Stations,
130-31 (1981) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (available from

University Microfilms International).
37. Loy A. Singleton, FCC Minority Ownership Policy and Non-Entertainment
Programming in Black-Oriented Radio Stations, 25(2) J. BROAD. 195, 199 (1981).
38. J. R. Schement & L. A. Singleton, The Onus of Minority Ownership: FCC Policy
and Spanish-LanguageRadio, 31 1. COMiMS. 78, 81 (1981).
39. David Honig, Relationships Among EEO, Program Service, and Minority
Ownership in Broadcast Regulation, in PROCEEDINGS FROM THE TENTH ANNUAL
TELECOMMS. POLICY RESEARCH CONFERFN CE 85 (1983).
40. Deregulation of Radio, Second Report and Order,96 F.C.C.2d 930, 55 Rad. Reg.2d

(P &F) 1401 (1984) (proceeding terminated).
41. Deregulation of Radio, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 505 para.
4, 60 Bad. Reg. 2d (P & F)789 (1986).
42. See Lamprecht v. FCC, 958 F.2d 382 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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minority programming. In 1995, Jeff Dubin and M.L. Spitzer summarized
the findings:
Judge Thomas found that, of stations owned primarily by women,
approximately thirty-five percent reported broadcasting women's
programming, while twenty-eight percent of the stations owned by
men reported doing so. In contrast, seventy-nine percent of blackowned stations reported programming for blacks, as opposed to only
twenty percent of stations owned by non-blacks doing so. And similar
statistics showed increases of ten to seventy-four percent for I-Ispanic
owners, three to twenty-five percent for Asian/Pacific Islander owners,
and four to forty-six percent for Indian or Alaskan owners. The
percentage increase of targeted programming was only approximately
twenty-five percent for women [(28%)(1.25)=35%], while for the other
groups it was far higher.43
Dubin and Spitzer, using the same data set, performed their own
analysis and supported the conclusion that a link existed between minority
ownership and programming:
It would be reasonable to conclude that the hypothesis that minority
ownership affects minority programming (Hypothesis 3) is generally
accepted. More particularly, Hypotheses 3.1 (Hispanic), 3.2 (black)
and 3.4 (female) are all confirmed-Hispanic owners are more likely
to program Spanish formats and target Hispanic listeners; black owners
are more likely to program black formats and target black listeners;
and female owners are more likely to program women's formats and
target women. Only Hypothesis 3.3-that Asian/Pacific Islander
owners will be more likely to program for Asian/Pacific Islanders-is
uncertain. 44
They also found that increasing minority ownership increased the total
amount of minority programming in a broadcast market-not just cause a
transfer of minority programming from non-minority stations to those
owned by minorities.
In a recent article, Allen Hammond 46 reviewed how the courts in
Metro Broadcasting47 and Lutheran Church" addressed the question of a
link between minority ownership and programming. At this point, it
appears that there is neither consensus about the existence of the linkage
between ownership and programming nor a method to convert such a
43. Jeff Dubin & M. L. Spitzer, Testing Minority Preferences in Broadcasting, 68 S.

L. REv. 841,851-52 (1995).
44. id. at 866.
45. Id. at 866-67.
46. See Allen S. Hammond, IV, Measuring the Nexus: The Relationship Between
Minority Cwnership and BroadcastDiversity After Metro Broad., 51 FED. COMM. Li. 627
(1999).
47. See Metro Broad. Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
48. See Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. FCC, 141 F.3d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
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linkage, if it exists, into economic terms. One might seek alternative data
sources, such as advertising revenues, or use time-choice models for future
research. As a result, this Article ignores programming effects for the
remaining sections.
IV. MODELS AND DATA NEEDS
A. Specific Effects Underthe Model
1. Cost to Minority Broadcasters
Following the logic presented above, this Article proposes a multistep approach to measuring the costs of the financial qualification
requirements. Table 1 presents the research issues described in Part II(B)
and the specific approaches this Article uses to quantify the costs.
The financial model this Article develops for Step 1 uses a
spreadsheet incorporating actual and projected financial statements for a
"typical" broadcaster.49 This spreadsheet utilizes existing data for the early
years and estimates for the growth rates of revenues, costs, etc. for the later
years. This Article arbitrarily relies upon a ten-year time horizon; this can
easily be changed. The model has revenue and operating cost data adapted
from a recent SEC filing of a publicly-held multi-station broadcaster. The
data on the financial structure (long-term debt and equity) and on the
capital investments are completely fictional and serve illustrative purposes
only. Other data have been rounded to further disguise the source. The
overall effects of the rounding are that valuation estimates are in the range
of 10% to 20% higher than otherwise would be the case.
One can approach the problem of estimating the current value of past
economic and policy choices in either of two ways: (1) calculate all values
using prices and other data from the past and then adjust the result to the
current period, or (2) calculate all values using today's prices, interest rates,
and so on. This Article uses the second approach because it is easy to
explain-there is little mystery as to the source of much of the data as they
come from current financial statements of broadcasters and can be
compared to similar publicly available information.
Since this Article only addresses changes from a base point, the
specific values used in the model are less important than correctly assessing
basic relationships, such as capital to revenues. Data from publicly held
49. This financial model was created using Microsoft Excel 2000. Yale M. Braunstein,
Financial Model Spreadsheet, at http:/Wvw.sims.berkeley.edu/-bigyale/special.html (last
modified Aug. 20,2000).
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broadcasters of comparable size, especially from the years under
consideration, would enable one to calibrate the model. Once this
calibration is done, it is completely straightforward to change the cost of
long-term financing, for instance, and calculate the effects of that change
on the stream of cash flows and profits over time.

Step
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Table 1: Measuring the Cost of the Economic Barrier
Objective
Approach
Quantify the effect of the
Develop a financial model
financial qualification
(operations and valuation) of
requirements on minority
the archetypal broadcaster.
broadcasters through the
Evaluate alternate scenarios.
increase in cost of funds.
(See discussion below on
valuation.)
Adjust for risk-adjusted
Obtain estimates from
higher costs to small
economic literature and revise
businesses,
financial model.
Estimate number of potential Use interviews, secondary
minority entrants that were
sources, etc. Possibly, value
excluded from the market by
lost equals average value of
the requirements and
licensee in similar market
calculate the economic loss
times probability of obtaining
resulting from that exclusion, license (with no financing
barrier).
Adjust for lack of internally
Obtain estimates from
generated funds.
economic literature and revise
financial model.
Adjust for changes in
Use interviews, secondary
ownership structure and
sources, etc., and revise
reduced minority interests.
financial model.
Adjust for station "quality"
Use interviews, secondary
and market size.
sources, etc., and revise
financial model.
Estimate employment effects. Add employment module to
financial model.

Once those values are ascertained, convert any set of results from a
flow over time to a single value. There are a number of valuation models
used in estimating the market value of broadcast properties. This Article's
model shows cash-flow-based valuation approaches. If other approaches
are considered more appropriate, they can be used. The "beauty" of this
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approach is that, in applying the approach, one may be able to say
something like: "The financial qualification requirements in the 1980s
resultedin the loss of broadcastersvalued at $X in the minority community.
The major factors that led to this loss were Y and Z. If the minority tax
certificates hadnot been available,the loss would have been even greater,
by $W."
All of the valuation approaches rely, directly or indirectly, on a
calculation that converts future values to the present. Both the base
valuation and the changes-from increased financing costs, for exampledepend largely on the "discount rate" used in the calculations. Appraisals,
reports from stock analysts, and trade journals should provide sufficient
information to point to reasonable values. Additionally, the 1980s, the
decade under consideration, was a period of fluctuating, and sometimes
unusually high, interest rates. Nevertheless, the model can be adjusted
accordingly.
Similarly, the model can be adjusted to reflect the problems described
in Steps 2, 4, 5, and 6. In each case, changes in the appropriate entries, such
as in debt/equity ratios for Step 5, can be made and the results analyzed.
The problem resulting from the exclusion of potential minority entrants
requires a different approach in Step 3. Here one can obtain estimates of
the number of firms that failed to even seek licenses because of the
financing barriers and use the model to estimate the valuation that each of
those firms might have obtained.
2. Minority Broadcast Employment
It is reasonably straightforward to add an employment module to the
financial model described above (Step 7). One can use the data on the
differences in employment patterns for minority and non-minority
broadcasters, whether aggregated for all employees or disaggregated by job
classification, to estimate the dollar value of these losses to minority
employees.
3. Minority Programming Practices
This is the most difficult area to analyze from an economic
perspective for two, very different, reasons. First, as described above, no
clear agreement exists on the degree to which ownership influences
programming patterns-or even whether there is any linkage at all. Second,
it is difficult to know how best to translate any difference in programming
into an estimate of economic loss. To illustrate this second point, assume
minority-owned stations transmit, on average, X additional hours of
minority programming per week. If this minority programming were
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produced entirely by minority-owned production firms, one could estimate
the dollar loss to the minority community that results from not having that
additional programming broadcast. If minority ownership of the applicable
production companies were less than one hundred percent and one knew
about the average ownership mix, one could estimate the fraction of the
dollars that would have been lost. Program production is an unregulated
business, however, and it is unlikely that such data are available or could
even be generated on order or request of the Commission. Similarly, a
complex model would be required to make use of advertising data or
detailed information of listener preferences.
At this time, the best that one can do is to develop better analysis and
data, building on the research described in Part MI(C)(3) above, in an effort
to further document the link between minority ownership and programming
patterns. This also holds true for other "content" related areas, such as
editorial opinions, news coverage, etc. In each of these areas, economic
values to the loss in diversity, if any, cannot be assigned.
B. Sample Calculations
In this section, the financial model illustrates how one could estimate
the financial loss from scenarios reflecting the policy issues described
above. There are a number of assumptions common to each estimate
generated. Many of these assumptions should be changed to better reflect
the reality of minority broadcast ownership, but the approach should be
instructive. Specifically, this Article assumes:
(1) The financial model is for a hypothetical publicly held, corporate
group owner of a mix of AM and FM radio stations.
(2) It owns approximately one hundred stations in approximately
twenty different markets and was purchased in the start-up year
(in the 1990s) for $450 million' s o
(3) These markets are in metropolitan statistical areas ("MSAs") that
range from twentieth to two hundredth in population. (Of course,
groups of this size did not exist in the 1980s. If one were to use
data from that period, both the size of a group and its financial
results would be lower. Whether this would result in a change in
per-station valuations, after adjusting for inflation and changed
50. Average purchase prices have grown considerably over the years. For example, a
1978 data compilation from the broadcasting industry demonstrated that the price for station
purchases by blacks in the 1972-76 period ranged from approximately $500,000 to $1.5

million. Lawrence Soley & George Hough Ill, Black Ownership of Commercial Radio
Stations: An Economic Evaluation, 22 J. BRoAD. 455, 461 (1978). The average price paid

by white purchasers for 18 stations in the top ten markets was $3.1 million. Id.
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economic conditions, is not calculated.)
(4) All investment was made at start-up. Approximately one-half of
the required funds came in the form of equity investments by
owners, and the other half came from a long-term loan at 7%
interest per year.
(5) Rather than worry about a loan repayment schedule or dividend
policy, this Article assumes that cash accumulated over the tenyear time horizon and earned 5% on year-end balances. (More
than $450 million of initial funds were obtained so that the group
would maintain a positive level of cash in every year.)
(6) Revenues, operating costs, and overhead (general and
administrative costs) grow at annual rates of 10%, 8%, and 6%,
respectively. The starting values were taken from a filing of a
publicly held group broadcaster of approximately comparable
size.
(7) A number of specialized assumptions about depreciation rates and
accounts payable and receivable were made. The corporate tax
rate is set at 34%, and net operating loss carry-forwards are
allowed.
(8) All values such as investments needed, interest rates, expected
growth rates, etc., are appropriate for the period being analyzed.
The valuation methods produce reasonable approximations of
actual market values. This Article assumes a "required" return on
equity of 25% and uses two valuation methods that differ in their
treatment of "terminal values," and then averages the two results.
The above assumptions lead to a base case valuation of $437 million,
or just under $4.4 million per station in today's dollars. In other words, an
equity investment of $250 million allows the ownership of broadcasting
properties worth $437 million, but a loan of $240 million remains to be
repaid. Note that the valuation approaches, but does not equal, the assumed
investment of $450 million in the stations. The difference may be viewed
-as indicative of the fact that rarely would a theoretical valuation match the
market price one actually has to pay.
1. Scenario 1: Weak Barrier to Entry
In this scenario, the model assumes that minority broadcasters must
pay higher interest rates to obtain long-term debt financing, but no other
changes are necessary. In other words, there are no changes in capital
structure, no additional loan origination fees, etc., and the model ignores
the question whether the loan was somehow more risky. Specifically, the
interest on the long-term debt increased by one percentage point, to 8%
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annually. The "weighted average cost of capital" also changes. The new
valuation is $393 million. In arriving at this result, one does not have to
distinguish between higher interest rates from illegal discrimination by
lenders and higher rates that result from the increased risk in lending to
minority enterprises. In either case, there is a quantifiable loss. In other
words, the one percentage point increase in external financing costs alone
leads to each station losing approximately $440,000 in value, or just over
10% of its original value.
2. Scenario 2: Strong Barrier to Entry
Every station comparable to the "average" station in the original
group of 100 has a value of approximately $4.4 million under the original
assumptions. If the lack of available funds reduces the number of minorityowned stations by some number, say N, the loss of economic value to the
minority community is approximately $(4.4 times N) million. This estimate
ignores any additional losses to the community, such as what might occur if
non-minority broadcasters hire fewer minority employees.
3. Scenario 3: Value of Minority Tax Certificates
Assume that the base case start-up investment cost of $450 million
came about from use of a minority tax certificate. In other words, the "true"
market value is approximately $600 million, as the use of the certificate is
conditioned on minorities being able to purchase the properties at 75% or
less of market value. The exact value of this discount depends on the
sources and costs of the additional funding. To take just two of the possible
cases, assume the additional $150 million comes from either (a) all debt
financing, or (b) a 50-50 mix of debt and equity. In either case, the business
must be viewed as more risky-profit rates will decline and additional debt
will be incurred. Therefore, we adjust the interest rate on loans to 8% (from
the base case of 7%) and the required return on equity to 30% (up from
25%). The valuation now drops to $290 million in (a) and to $286 million
in (b). Despite the fact that the new owner had to pay $150 million more
for the stations than with the minority tax certificate, the stations have lost
approximately one-third of their value from the base case. The deterioration
is so severe that, to their new owners, they are actually only worth
approximately 65% of their original "market" value. Whether this is
realistic depends, of course, on exactly what happens to the costs of funds,
considering both the long-term debt from lenders and the equity funds from
the owners. (If the higher cost prevented the transaction from being
undertaken, the loss to the minority community would be the full value of
the license.)
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C. Summary of Calculations
Remember that the station financial model in each scenario is based
in current dollars. If desired, each of the scenarios above could be refined
and calibrated to the historical situation of the 1980s and the results
converted to today's prices. Nevertheless, the results, summarized in Table
2, demonstrate that the approach described above can produce useful
estimates of the losses that result from barriers to the entry of minority
firms into the ranks of this nation's broadcasters.
Table 2: Summary of Calculations
Valuation
Scenario Major Changes
(per station)

Change from Base
Case

-

$4.37 million

$3.93 million

($0.44 million)

2

Increased cost of
L-T Debt
No entry

Varies

($4.37 million per

3

No minority tax

(a)$2.90 million
(b) $2.86 million

Base
Case

I

station

certificate

"lost")

(a) ($l.47million)
(b) ($1.51 million)

V. CONCLUSION

This Article develops a financial model of an archetypal radio
broadcast group that enables the estimation of the value of an individual
broadcast property and to the calculation of the effects of various practices
and policies on that value. The logic is straightforward: if a certain practice
(e.g., discrimination in lending) or policy (e.g., discontinuation of minority
tax certificates) raises the cost to the entrant, it removes wealth from the
minority community. Regardless of whether the original effect occurs all at
once or over several years, as in the case of higher interest rates, the change
in wealth is measured in dollars as a lump sum. For example, the
hypothetical data found that an increase in the interest rate for the longterm loan at start-up led to a value reduction of approximately $440,000 per
station at today's prices. Using a similar approach, the model demonstrated
that discontinuation of the minority tax certificate program results in a loss
of value of approximately $1.5 million for each station transfer that is
effected (again, in current dollars).
This Article addressed two other questions in addition to the effects of
barriers to entry on the determination of value. The effects of barriers on

90
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employment can be measured within the framework provided here,
although this Article does not show any sample calculations. It is likely that
the largest portion of these effects will result from the "strong" barrier
cases. If minority groups cannot acquire stations because of the lack of
funding, the composition of the workforce does not change.
The third area this Article investigated related to programming. The
analysis was unable to incorporate changes in programming for two
reasons: (1) the linkage between ownership and programming is uncertain
at best, and (2) there is no useful approach to convert changes in
programming into changes in wealth.

